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Summary

The claimant was found on a reassessment to fail the work capability assessment- ie, not to have limited capability for work. At the time of the decision about this, she had a job with the police force as a cleaner but was not able to return to it. The decision was made some three weeks after she had had an operation on her right wrist/arm. On appeal, it was argued that regulation 29(2)(b) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008, SI No. 794 applied to her - ie, that she should be treated as having limited capability for work, on the basis that were she not so treated there would be a 'substantial risk' to her health or that of another person. The tribunal dismissed the appeal.

Judge Wright allowed the claimant's further appeal and remitted the case for consideration by a new tribunal. The tribunal had erred in not exploring, in the context of the 'substantial risk' argument, why it was that the claimant could not return to her job as a cleaner. Her argument to the tribunal was that, applying the test to the substantial risk rule set out by the Court of Appeal in Charlton v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, reported as R(IB) 2/09, the type and range of work the claimant could do without such risk was heavily restricted at the time, as she was not long out of surgery. On any analysis, held the judge, her job as a cleaner, 'was the type of job the appellant was as a matter of her aptitudes and training capable of performing'. Why she was not performing it was unclear and that remained so because the tribunal failed to explore the question, despite the fact that that was plainly relevant to the Charlton risk assessment (paragraph 13). It was insufficient for the tribunal merely to have found, as it did in its decision, that it 'did not accept that there was not an adequate range of work' which the claimant could do without substantial risk (paragraph 14).

However, the judge did not consider that there was any potential relevance in this case, or in most others, in the possibility that the claimant may have lost her job as a cleaner were the substantial risk rule not applied and were she not treated as having limited capability for work. It was unclear whether that contention was being made or not, but insofar as it was it seemed to consist of an argument that the potential loss of a job which a person already has constitutes a 'risk' for the purposes of regulation 29(2)(b). That was not accepted by the judge. The risk referred to related to jobs a person could do, so that if a person were for the time being unable to do her/his existing job but was able and suited to do other work without risk, then the substantial risk rule would not apply. Also the risk had to arise out of the person's specific disease or bodily or mental disablement, and be a substantial risk to her/his physical or mental health or that of another person. Except possibly in some rare cases involving mental illness, the judge considered potential loss of employment too remote to count for these purposes (paragraphs 15-18).

Summary

The claimant suffered from agoraphobia. On conversion of her income support award to a claim for ESA, she was held to fail the work capability assessment. She appealed but the First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal, holding that she scored only nine points under descriptor 15(b) ('is unable to get to a specified place with which the claimant is familiar, without being accompanied by another person').

Judge Turnbull allowed the claimant's further appeal and remitted the case for consideration by a new tribunal. He considered it possible that she may also have scored six points under descriptor 16(c) ('engagement in social contact with someone unfamiliar to the claimant is not possible for the majority of the time due to difficulty relating to others or significant distress experienced by the individual'). The tribunal had erred in apparently assuming that, provided the claimant had the ability to engage with others, the fact that her anxiety could only be allayed by having a friend or relative within easy reach could not bring her within that descriptor (paragraph 14). The evidence was that the claimant could not go out of the house on her own and had to get a taxi to the hospital or doctor's surgery, but could not go to crowded places because of anxiety about feeling faint. The judge accepted that difficulty 'in simply getting alone to the destination' was not covered by activity 16, if the claimant could then engage in social contact without difficulty (paragraph 11). However, the descriptors also referred to where such engagement was precluded because of significant distress experienced by the individual', and it was possible that the effect of having to leaving home unaccompanied, or to enter unfamiliar buildings, caused distress which then prevented the claimant from being able to engage in social contact. For the judge, if the claimant was 'anxious about being in places where she might get into difficulties if she was unaccompanied by a friend or relative and fainted, and that anxiety prevented her from engaging with others, that would in my judgement be capable of bringing her within 16(c), although the "majority of the time" requirement would of course need to be satisfied' (paragraphs 11-14).

The judge also considered that the tribunal should have considered whether there was a 'substantial risk' to the claimant's health were she found not to have limited capability for work, in which case, under regulation 29(2)(b) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 , SI No. 794, she should be treated as having limited capability for work. For the judge, in a situation where regulation 15(b) was the only one satisfied, a tribunal will 'almost inevitably' need to consider regulation 29(2)(b), and the same was probably true where other descriptors in activities 15 and 16 applied that scored only nine or six points. That was because 'inability, for mental reasons, to get to a specified place with which the claimant is familiar without being accompanied inevitably raises the question what the effect on the claimant's mental health would be if he or she were found not to have limited capability for work' (paragraph 15).

Summary

The claimant suffered from depression and extreme bouts of anger and rage. He claimed problems with day-to-day activities and personal interaction. In July 2011, he had been placed in the support group; however, a few months later he was re-examined and following completion of a questionnaire, including details of his GP and a psychotherapist with whom he had a forthcoming appointment, he was assessed at a medical by a registered physiotherapist with no apparent professional expertise in mental health matters. The medical took 15 minutes. Although he was still considered to have limited capability for work, he was held not to be in the support group - ie, not to have limited capability for work-related activity. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed his appeal, which did not include an oral hearing and did not have reference to the July 2011 medical report or any further medical evidence.

Judge Mark allowed the claimant's appeal and remitted the case for rehearing by a new tribunal. On the facts of this case, the tribunal had erred in not at least considering adjourning to get a copy of the 2011 medical report that placed the claimant in the support group, and in not seeking further evidence about his condition from the claimant or preferably medical records relating to his mental health and history of violence; the tribunal also erred in failing to explain how it dealt with the claimant's own evidence about his condition (paragraphs 14-15, 20).

Further, the only evidence before the tribunal other than that of the claimant was that of the physiotherapist. Where the examining healthcare professional (or 'disability analyst', as she was described in this case) possesses relevant medical expertise, any opinion based on that is relevant evidence. But the judge then held, 'Where, however, the disability analyst is a physiotherapist and the problems she is dealing with are mental health problems the opinion of the physiotherapist as to the conclusions to be drawn have no probative value whatsoever. This is because the physiotherapist has no professional expertise in mental health matters' (paragraph 22). The judge went on to express surprise that a physiotherapist had been used in a case where the only issue was the mental health of the claimant, and that the evidence was produced following a 15-minute interview. 'lt is plainly important,' said the judge, 'that questions of mental health should be assessed by a disability analyst with appropriate mental health qualifications if their opinion is to be of any evidential value' (paragraph 23).

Comment from CPAG

Although the facts of the case were clearly important, there is no reason why the principles apparent in the decision should be restricted to work-related activity cases, or indeed to cases involving mental health assessments conducted by physiotherapists. The key point is that to be of evidential (probative) value, the assessment must be carried out by someone properly qualified to do so.

Summary

The claimant had been out of hospital following an operation for around three weeks when she was assessed under the work capability assessment. Although she was treated as having limited capability for work on the basis of recovery from in-patient treatment, she was not assessed as having limited capability for work-related activity - ie, she was not put in the support group. The claimant appealed against that as well as a number of aspects of the decision. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal, saying in the decision that it was satisfied that the claimant did not meet any of the relevant descriptors in the test for work-related activity.

Judge Wright allowed the claimant's further appeal and remitted the case for rehearing by a new tribunal. The main error in the tribunal's decision was the failure adequately to explain why it considered that (given that she was only recently out of hospital) there was no 'substantial risk' to her health or that of another person, as referred to in regulation 35(2)(b) of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008, SI No. 794 (paragraph 12). A related but equally important error was that the tribunal had failed to identify, as required by the decision of Judge Jacobs in AH v SSWP [2013] UKUT 118 (AAC), the 'range or type of work-related activity' that the claimant was capable of performing and might be expected to undertake (paragraph 13). Judge Wright endorsed AH v SSWP in this regard.

The tribunal was hampered in that task by the failure of the Secretary of State to provide this information. For Judge Wright, the failure by the Secretary of State to put this information before the tribunal 'was a mistake and a serious breach of his duties' to the tribunal (paragraph 15). The claimant had expressly raised as a ground of appeal whether she came within regulation 35(2)(b) (ie, whether the substantial risk provision applied to her), and the Secretary of State had accepted that this was an issue raised by the appeal. In those circumstances, the Secretary of State was obliged under rule 24(2)(e) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008, SI No.2685 to say whether he opposed the claimant on this point and, if so, state any grounds for that opposition not already in documents before the tribunal. His failure to do this was 'a serious breach' of his obligations under the rules. He should have set out the range or type of work-related activity the claimant was capable of performing and might be expected to undertake and explain why there would be no substantial risk to the claimant's or another person's health were she not found to have limited capability for work-related activity (paragraphs 17-20).

Decision in brief

Restriction of HRP to those in receipt of UK child benefit, in conjunction with presence/residence test for child benefit, acts a restriction on right of free movement in the EU and not objectively justified - on facts of present case Article 21 Treaty on Functioning of the European Union and EC Regulation 1408/71 requires Secretary of State to take account of claimant's child-raising period in Belgium as if that had been completed in UK and her pre-existing award of child benefit had continued

Decision in brief

Claimant's delayed return of form Ml 12 with mortgage information resulted in supersession for change of circumstances - but the change of circumstance was the expiry of the 13-week waiting period, and Secretary of State already aware of that-therefore not a late notification of change - default rule that change takes effect from date it occurred applies, with result that housing costs backdated to end of waiting period

Summary

The claimant failed the work capability assessment and appealed. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal and, in doing so, held that regarding Activity 1 of the assessment (mobilising) the claimant was able to mobilise with the aid of either crutches or a manual wheelchair, as she had no problem with her upper limbs. The claimant appealed to the Upper Tribunal.

Judge Gray allowed the claimant's further appeal and remitted the case for consideration by a new tribunal. The tribunal had erred in failing to consider the 'critical' issue of whether either a wheelchair or crutches can 'reasonably' be used (paragraph 6). The new tribunal would have to decide that question. In so holding, the judge made findings on what had to be taken into account in applying the reasonableness test to this question. The judge held that the approach to Activity 1 and to Activity 7 (communication) regarding the use of aids and appliances was, 'if the claimant does not use a particular type of aid or appliance and one has not been prescribed or recommended, then the decision-maker or First-tier Tribunal is entitled to take the view that the claimant should be assessed as if using one only if such an aid can be reasonably used by the claimant, reasonableness of use being considered in terms of the effect such use would have upon their medical condition' (paragraphs 23--25). Initially, it was for the Secretary of State to establish that the aid (eg, the wheelchair) could reasonably be used, and to do so it was insufficient simply to rely on the absence of, or minimal, upper limb or cardiorespiratory problems; that related to the ability to propel a wheelchair, but did not establish that one could reasonably be used (paragraph 26). Use of a wheelchair was qualitatively different from using a walking stick, and use of one had attendant physical consequences such as muscle wasting and, consequently, 'the threshold for whether its use is reasonable must be higher than that of a simple manually used aid which could be discarded without physical consequence' (paragraph 27). The judge later expanded that approach slightly, in holding that the reasonableness test was limited to, '... the medical impact, which will involve consideration of the potential physical and mental consequences for a claimant or appellant' (paragraph 29).

In so holding, Judge Gray approved the approach taken in Northern Ireland by Commissioner Stockman in MG v Department for Social Development (ESA) [2013] NI Com 359 that it was difficult to conclude that a wheelchair can reasonably be used without the person having been referred by their clinicians for a wheelchair assessment (paragraph 27). Conversely, she respectfully disagreed with the decision of Judge Gamble in DM v SSWP [2012] UKUT 376 (AAC) that the reasonableness test involved the consideration of personal circumstances such as living in an unsuitable building (paragraph 29).

Comment from CPAG

In the light of this decision and that in AR v SSWP, the caselaw authority is now weighted in favour of the view that the reasonableness test regarding aids and adaptations is with reference to medical factors rather than personal circumstances. The medical factors under consideration should include both physical and mental medical factors, and it will generally not be appropriate to conclude that use of a wheelchair is reasonable where the claimant has not been referred by her/his doctor for an assessment. As per AR v SSWP, reference to medical factors also includes the ability to get in and out of the wheelchair unaided and to handle the chair when not in it.

Summary

The claimant had health problems, including a severe ankle injury and depression. He failed the work capability assessment. The First-tier Tribunal rejected his appeal, holding that he did not score points for mobilising, as he used an electric wheelchair on occasions, and that he would be able to propel himself in a manual wheelchair. The tribunal rejected the argument that on the evidence his asthma would cause breathlessness when propelling himself.

Judge Williams rejected the claimant's further appeal, holding that on the facts of the case the tribunal had not erred in law. In so doing, he reviewed the caselaw on the application of Activity 1 (mobilising unaided), in particular with regard to the question of ability to use a manual wheelchair unaided. There was a reasonableness test as part of this question. There were practical problems in considering this, as neither the ESA50 self-assessment questionnaire nor the standard ESA85 electronic medical report addressed directly the question of whether the claimant could use a manual wheelchair if one was not normally used (paragraphs 12-13). For Judge Williams, reasonableness had to include not only the ability to self-propel, but also the ability to get in and out of the wheelchair unaided and to handle the wheelchair unaided when not in it (paragraphs 32-36).

Regarding the caselaw, the judge contrasted the approaches taken by Judge Gamble in DM v SSWP [2012] UKUT 376 (AAC), in which it was held that personal circumstances such as ability to store a wheelchair were relevant, with the rejection of that most recently by Judge Gray in TB v SSWP, holding that the reasonableness test was limited to medical issues. Siding with Judge Gray but with a caveat, Judge Williams said:

I agree with Judge Gray to the extent that putting an 'all the circumstances' test into the descriptor carried the danger of testing the context too widely. I disagree with her in what appears to be a constrained view of the 'medical consequences', which I take to include mental health issues as well as physical issues. I agree with that. But it has to be asked in every case whether this particular claimant can reasonably mobilise with a manual wheelchair without the assistance of any other personas a practical question... the user has to be able to get into it and out of it unaided and has to be able to deal unaided with the other aspects inherent in using a wheelchair to mobilise. That involves looking broadly at the whole physical and mental functional ability of the claimant and not merely at lower limb use (paragraph 38).

Summary

The claimant was a four-year-old child. Her parents were unable to be entitled to HB, as her father was in prison (for a period meaning he could not still be treated as occupying the property), and her mother was a 'person from abroad' and so precluded from entitlement. The local authority refused the claim on the basis that it was not reasonable to treat the claimant as liable to pay the rent. The First-tier Tribunal allowed the claimant's appeal (she was represented by a law centre), holding that she should be treated as liable.

Judge Wright allowed the further appeal of the local authority, and substituted a decision that the claimant was not entitled to HB. The tribunal's reasoning on the issue of whether the claimant should be treated as liable was inadequate. Also (something that did not feature in the tribunal's decision), the claimant did not satisfy the national insurance number (NINO) requirement and so could not be entitled to HB. Regarding the NINO requirement, that was set out at section 1 (1A) and (1B) of the Social Security Act 1998. In particular, subsection (1A) required that, 'no person whose entitlement to any benefit depends on his making a claim shall be entitled to the benefit unless subsection (1B) below applies in relation both to the person making the claim and to any other person in 'respect of whom he is claiming benefit.' For the judge, the words that applied to the claimant were 'the person making the claim', and the person making the claim cannot also be a 'person in respect of whom' the claim is made. That was important, as that meant that the exception from the NINO requirement for children 'in respect of whom' HB was claimed, at regulation 4(1)(b) of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, SI No.213, could not apply in this case (paragraph 25). On the facts of the case, the claimant neither had, nor had applied for, a NINO at the time of the claim, and so did not meet the NINO requirement.

Regarding the question of the liability of the claimant to pay rent, the relevant rule was at regulation 8(1)(c). That provided that a person was to be treated as liable if s/he was someone who 'has to make the payments if he is to continue to live in the home because the person liable to make them is not doing so and... he is some other person whom it is reasonable to treat as liable to make the payments'. The tribunal erred in not addressing this properly. Specifically, it had erred in not addressing properly the questions as to whether the person liable to make the payments was not making them, and whether the claimant had to make the payments if she were to continue to live in the home. The tribunal had not made sufficient findings of fact about either of these questions. However, the judge considered that there was no need to remit these matters to a new tribunal, as in any event the claimant was not entitled to housing benefit because she did not meet the NINO requirement (paragraphs 10-18).

Summary

This case concerned an appeal by the local authority against a decision that an accommodation provider, Salisbury Independent Living (SIL), met the definition of a 'voluntary organisation' in the HB rules, and that therefore the claimants occupied 'exempt accommodation'. SIL is formally a not-for-profit organisation that leased property for renting from a company ('SMS'). That company had another connection to SIL in that a director of SMS had also previously set up SIL and was now a consultant to it, and he stood to gain through his directorship of SMS and consultancy with SIL. The First-tier Tribunal had held that SIL was a voluntary organisation, and the local authority appealed to the Upper Tribunal.

Mr Justice Charles dismissed the appeal. On the facts of this case, the tribunal had not erred in holding SIL to be a voluntary organisation for the purposes of exempt accommodation. In so holding, the judge was required to consider the definition of 'voluntary organisation' in that context, for which there was no previous caselaw authority. 'Voluntary organisation' was defined in regulation at regulation 2 of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, SI No.213 as 'a body, other than a public or local authority, the activities of which are carried on otherwise than for profit'. The local authority relied heavily on official guidance which included that a voluntary organisation, 'does not have arrangements with any person, organisation or body formally or informally to make payments or dividends, quasi dividends or disguised profits from its operations or in selling, disposal or winding up it is assets or operations' (cited in paragraph 12). It was argued that for an organisation to be a voluntary organisation, it must not be possible for any person or organisational body to make profits from its activities. It was accepted that arrangements between the accommodation provider (ie, SIL in this case) and an independent third party that could profit were not caught by this approach, but that (as here) where there was a close connection with the third party, the possibility that that third party could profit meant the provider could not be a voluntary organisation. That, it was argued for the local authority, was so even where (as expressly conceded here) there was no question of any allegation of lack of commerciality or bona fides in the relationship or any allegation of disguised profits (paragraphs 17-24).

The judge dismissed the arguments of the local authority. The starting point was that it was axiomatic that whether an organisation was a voluntary organisation 'falls to be decided by the application of the relevant statutory definition to the facts of the given case' (paragraph 27). Also, it was right to consider the definition 'against the backdrop of the general reality of personal and commercial life' (paragraph 29). Taking that approach, the judge considered that it was obvious that any third-party organisation that the accommodation provider entered into a relationship with would seek to make a profit, and Parliament could not have intended that in all such cases the provider could not therefore count as a voluntary organisation. If followed that the official guidance on that point was 'simply wrong' (paragraphs 38-9).

Further, the attempted refinement of that position to apply it to cases of close connection between the provider and the third party was also wrong. For the judge, as soon as one recognised that a provider can enter into arrangements with third parties that have separate legal identities and still remain a not-for-profit organisation itself, the local authorities' argument was 'doomed to failure on the basis that it fails to have any or any proper regard to the realities of commercial life based on well-established principles of law' that Parliament must have taken into account when drawing up the rules. Parliament's primary intention was to ensure that HB continued to meet rents that reflected the bona fide and commercially based higher costs associated with specialist supported accommodation (paragraph 45-6, 48-9).

Regarding the activities of the accommodation provider itself (SIL, in this case), the judge recommended a sequential approach focusing first on the 'objects and powers' of the provider on the basis that they are complied with, on the accounts of the provider on the basis that they are accurate, and then on any other activities that might be relevant to either, or both, of the definition of exempt accommodation and any anti-abuse provision. In other situations, it may be relevant to look outside the constitution of the provider in determining whether it was providing exempt accommodation (paragraphs 75-6).

Comment from CPAG

This lengthy decision involves a detailed discussion of relationships between accommodation providers and third parties in the context of deciding when the provider may remain a 'voluntary organisation' for the purposes of exempt accommodation. Inevitably, it draws substantially on the individual facts. Those who need to ensure the definition is met in other cases are advised to give it careful scrutiny.

Summary

The claimants were entitled to working tax, credit (WTC) as a couple. The husband worked 16 hours a week; he ceased work in June 2010 but his wife started working 16 hours a week a few days later, with no change in household income. The couple considered that there was no need to report the change as it could not affect their joint entitlement. Consequently, the change was not notified until July 2011. When notified, HMRC decided that there had been a duty to report the change at the time, and terminated the joint claim four weeks after the husband stopped work; also, a new claim was necessary on the basis of the wife's employment. As that could only be backdated for three months from notification of the employment in July 2011, there was a consequent gap in entitlement from July 2010 to April 2011. The claimants' appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal.

Judge Mark allowed their further appeal and held that they had remained entitled to WTC throughout. HMRC and the tribunal had erred in law in holding otherwise. Firstly, under section 3(4) of the Tax Credits Act 2002, entitlement under a joint claim ceases if the person by whom it was made could no longer make a joint claim; but there is no provision for the claim to cease simply because there is a change of circumstances if the couple remain entitled to make a joint claim (paragraph 7). Secondly, under regulation 21 of the Tax Credits (Claims and Notifications) Regulations 2002, SI No.2014, there is a requirement to notify certain changes of circumstance which may decrease the rate of entitlement or mean that entitlement should cease. But in this case, the claimants had remained part of a couple, and although at regulation 21 (2) there were convoluted cases regarding cessation of entitlement where a person stops work for at least 16 hours a week, HMRC had attempted no explanation of how that might apply here, and in any case, considered the judge, even if it did apply so that they should have reported the change, there was no evidence that it would have affected the award so as to cease entitlement (paragraphs 11-12).

Summing up, the judge held, 'given that the claimant and his wife never ceased to be entitled to a tax credit and that because all the work was done for the same reward, I am unable to follow on what basis there was any power to terminate the award. Even if there was a change in the amount of remuneration, provided this was such as to leave some reduced entitlement to the award, this would only have entitled HMRC to amend the award and not to terminate it' (paragraph 13). Therefore, the final decision in this case should have been, 'on the basis that the original award continued and that the couple were jointly entitled to the tax credit for the whole year and that the amount should be calculated on that basis' (paragraph 14).

Summary

The claimant had agoraphobia and was liable to have panic attacks if he left the house. He appealed against a decision that he did not have incapacity for work (he was at the relevant time still in receipt of income support on that basis). He intended to attend the oral hearing, but on the day found it too much to do so, although his representative and his sister did attend. The representative applied at the hearing for an adjournment for a domiciliary hearing to be arranged. But the tribunal refused the application, heard the appeal in the claimant's absence, and refused his appeal. In its reasons, the tribunal said that there was ample notice of the hearing, the claimant was represented and the application for adjournment was 'extremely late', and that the application was refused as the tribunal did not consider it in the interests of justice or 'efficient despatch of proceedings'. The claimant appealed, including on the ground that the refusal to adjourn for a domiciliary hearing amounted to a denial of justice.

Judge Bano allowed the appeal and remitted the case for rehearing by a new tribunal. The tribunal had erred in its reasons for refusing to adjourn, and also in failing to consider whether the claimant, if found fit for work, was subject to a substantial risk to his health, something the judge considered relevant as the tribunal had awarded him points for being scared or anxious that work would bring back or worsen his illness (paragraphs 7-8). The Secretary of State supported the appeal regarding the refusal to adjourn. The context was rule 31 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008, SI No.2685 (the 'tribunal rules'), which had been referred to by the tribunal. In GJ v SSWP, JG and SW [2012] UKUT 447 (AAC), Judge Jacobs had held that the discretion to proceed with a hearing in a party's absence must be exercised with reference to the overriding objective at rule 2 to deal with a case 'fairly and justly'. That rule includes, 'ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings'; it also includes avoiding delay but only 'so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues'.

Judge Bano held that the tribunal was certainly entitled to have regard to the delay that would ensue from an adjournment for a domiciliary hearing to be arranged, but was also obliged to consider whether denying and adjournment would prevent the claimant from participating fully in the proceedings and whether it could decide the appeal properly without him being present. On the facts of this case, which included awards of different descriptors to those awarded at the medical and from those contended for by the claimant's representative, it was difficult to understand how the tribunal concluded it was in the 'interests of justice' to proceed in the claimant's absence (paragraph 6). Even if there was no breach of the right to a fair trial in this case (as there had been in CIB/2751/2002, which involved a refusal by a tribunal to order a domiciliary hearing for a claimant with agoraphobia), the tribunal's reasons did not show that it properly considered the overriding objective at rule 2 of the tribunal rules (paragraph 7). 

See the article in Bulletin 236, p5 for more on adjournments.